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Abstract. The economics discipline is a dynamic, foundational field in the social sciences. 
With a host of scholars eager to share the knowledge they create with the general public, the 
discipline addresses how scarce resources are allocated to meet human needs and objectives. 
Since resources are scarce and societies have to make tradeoffs between competing ends, 
economics offers a unique set of tools to address many of society’s most pressing concerns. 
Furthermore, it is common that once a scholar wins a Nobel Prize in economics that they 
produce a book for a broader public audience to explain their ideas.  
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1. Introduction  
he economics discipline is a dynamic, foundational field in the social 
sciences. With a host of scholars eager to share the knowledge they 
create with the general public, the discipline addresses how scarce 
resources are allocated to meet human needs and objectives. Since 
resources are scarce and societies have to make tradeoffs between 
competing ends, economics offers a unique set of tools to address many of 
society’s most pressing concerns. Furthermore, it is common that once a 
scholar wins a Nobel Prize in economics that they produce a book for a 
broader public audience to explain their ideas. Jean Tirole is one such 
scholar who won the 2014 Nobel Prize for his work in industrial and 
regulatory economics and has written a book to address relevant economic 
and social issues in Economics for the Common Good. For those unfamiliar 
with professor Tirole, he is an economist educated at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, emphasizing industrial organization, 
microeconomic theory, and regulatory economics. A remarkable scholar, 
when he was only in his mid-30s, he wrote The Theory of Industrial 
Organization, the definitive graduate-level text for industrial organization in 
a mature field with numerous seasoned scholars. He has also written nearly 
200 articles in leading journals, as well as 10 books. In recent years, he has 
expanded his interests to economics and psychology, and banking and 
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financial markets.  He has now synthesized his work and summarized it 
with other scholars work for a larger public audience. 
Theoretical and academic economics in the 1970s and 1980s was 
dominated by the prominent thinkers of the age: Milton Friedman, George 
Stigler, Gary Becker, and the procession of University of Chicago’s free-
market economists. Under the Chicago School, markets came to be seen as 
efficient market, self-regulatory, and the role of the state was in retreat. In 
the US, this discourse had political and economic consequences. The United 
Kingdom’s Margeret Thatcher and Unites States’ Ronald Reagan led a 
political response to the prevailing large-government Keysian state that 
was in opposition to the Chicago view of free-market individualism. Rather 
than an advocate for the public good, the state was largely relegated to an 
inefficient political institution “that was part of the problem.” Democrats 
are the political party most sympathetic toward government intervention, 
yet in 1996 President Bill Clinton’s State of the Union Address, he conceded 
that “the era of big government is over.” Markets were seen as so efficient 
that free-market dilatants soon took market benefits to unreasonable 
extremes. Long-standing regulatory institutions, such as the Glass-Steagall 
Act -legislation that separated retail from wholesale banks- were replaced 
with Gramm, Leach, Bliley, or the Financial Modernization Act of 1999. 
This regulatory reform allowed large banks to consolidate, which later 
became part of the explanation for the 2008 financial crisis. However, 
despite the view that government was inefficient, there was a body of 
economists that did not accept the conclusion that markets were 
ubiquitously efficient and self-regulatory. The academic, political, and 
social tides turned once again, and since 2008, the benefits of government 
oversight have returned to the economic and political forums.   
With pensive, non-confrontational prose Tirole lays down a 
contemplative narrative for how the economic academic environments of 
the 1980s and 1990s were heavily influenced by the free-market 
perspectives from Milton Friedman and the Chicago School. However, by 
the 2000s, the housing market collapsed, political systems were strained, 
and inequality became a major concern, even among previous die-hard 
market economists. It is against this backdrop that Jean Tirole offers an 
academic reflection on the modern role of the state and the economy, void 
of ad hominid attacks against scholars that disagree with him. 
Asymmetric information in market exchanges is an active area in 
economic research and many times is what separates practical from 
theoretical economics and other disciplines. Much of Economics for the 
Common Good applies asymmetric information in market transactions to 
study labor, financial, resource, and industrial economics. There are at least 
three forms of asymmetric information: adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and principal-agent dilemmas. Because of hidden information before and 
after a transaction, markets can fail to reach satisfactory social outcomes.  
Adverse selection is when there is hidden information on the part of the 
seller before a transaction. The well-known example is George Akerloff’s 
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market for lemons, where sellers of used cars withhold relevant 
information and receive above market value. Moral hazard results when 
there is hidden information on the part of buyer after a transaction.  
Insurance is the moral hazard example. Principle-agent dilemmas are a 
third form of asymmetric information that exists when a vertically 
organized principal is responsible for the actions of a down-stream agent 
who makes decisions on the part of the principal but does not face the 
principal’s same incentive structure. The objective is for the principal to 
devise an incentive scheme that brings the incentives of the agent into line 
with the principal, and principal-agent dilemmas are prominent with in 
institutions where the price mechanism is ineffective at allocating 
resources. Throughout the book, Tirole adeptly illustrates how asymmetric 
information, market failures, and distorted incentives in labor, capital, 
resource, and goods markets are not consistent with the common good. 
According to Economics for the Common Good, government involvement 
in the economy need not stop at asymmetric information and poorly 
formed legal arrangements. Throughout the text, Tirole offers areas where 
government is a complement rather than a substitute for the State.  
Inequality is pervasive in liberal market economies, and climate change -
potentially the greatest threat to civilization- are instances where 
government has an active role for the common good. The chapter on 
climate change and policies implemented to abate it is an objective outline 
to combat this threat using economic analysis. The 2008 financial crisis and 
derivatives that increase systematic risk are two additional areas where 
government’s expanded role serve to improve desired results. The effects 
of the digital economy are considered from both the rewards and costs 
perspective that technology brings. While technology and innovation 
decrease the costs of physical production, the array of potential sellers’ 
increases costs of finding a suitable match, illustrating the net benefits of 
technological evolution are the real concern. Moreover, modern 
microeconomic theory is dynamic, and the well-worn tools of elasticity and 
externalities are revisited in the context of the modern digital economy. 
Competition policy and network effects required for product adoption and 
the product life-cycle are considered relative to the dynamic digital 
economy.   
Occasionally writing for a broader audience descends into rhetoric and 
vitriol towards other scholars with whom scholars disagree, which defeats 
the credibility of writing a primer to educate broader, untrained students to 
a discipline. The questions in Economics for the Common Good seeks to 
answer are complex. Nonetheless, Tirole is a leading figure in regulatory 
economics with creative insights that are difficult to dismiss. Moreover, the 
book is written as an informed primer, which is valuable for both the 
novice and experienced economist.  Jean Tirole has written a balanced book 
with an intended audience for the general public that examines the tools of 
economics and how they can improve the public good that is pleasure 
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reading for both the novice and the informed consumer of economic 
literature. 
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